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The progressively ubiquitous connectivity in the present information systems 
pose newer challenges to security. The conventional security mechanisms 
have come a long way in securing the well-defined objectives of 
confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and availability. Nevertheless, with the 
growth in the system complexities and attack sophistication, providing 
security via traditional means are increasingly becoming unachievable. A 
novel theoretical perspective and an innovative approach are thus required for 
understanding security from a decision-making and strategic viewpoint. One 
of the analytical tools which may assist the researchers in designing security 
protocols for computer networks is game theory. The game-theoretic concept 
finds extensive applications in security at different levels, including the 
cyberspace and is generally categorized under security games. It can be 
utilized as a robust mathematical tool for modelling and analyzing 
contemporary security issues. Game theory offers a natural framework for 
capturing the defensive as well as adversarial interactions between the 
defenders and the attackers. Furthermore, defenders can attain a deep 
understanding of the potential attack threats and the strategies of attackers by 
equilibrium evaluation of the security games. In this paper, the concept of 
game theory has been presented, followed by game-theoretic applications in 
cybersecurity, including cryptography. Different types of games, particularly 
those focused on securing the cyberspace, have been analysed and varied 
game-theoretic methodologies including mechanism design theories have been 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Modern-day communication technology, as well as information, are progressing rapidly in terms of 
diversity and its sophistication level. The growing connectivity, pervasiveness and complexity in the current 
information systems pose novel challenges to security, with the cyberspace becoming a playground for people 
with varying skill levels and intentions – positive or negative. Thus, the protection of assets, identities and 
information is gaining more and more importance since constant connectivity has become an essential part of 
the daily life of people [1]. Besides, the social well-being and the economic progress of a nation are increasingly 
becoming reliant on cyberspace. The increasing interconnectivity, as well as the rise in the computational 
resource availability for attackers, offers them provision for sophisticated, unpredictable and distributed attacks 
[2]. Attackers can, therefore, cause disruptions to critical infrastructures, including financial networks, 
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telecommunications, energy pipelines, electrical power, refineries, etc. [3]. Recent events reveal the damage 
cyber-attacks can cause to private enterprises, governments and the public in general, in terms of reputation, 
data confidentiality and money [4]. For more than twenty years, the research community has been paying 
attention to the field of cyberspace security. Nevertheless, the cybersecurity issue has still not been solved 
completely. In this paper, the applicability of game-theoretic methods in solving cybersecurity issues has been 
explored.  
Contineours advancements have been accomplished by traditional security methods in the protection 
of well-defined goals viz. confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA). Cryptography is one such strong 
theoretic security foundation that depends on the cryptographic key secrecy. But as in social engineering attacks 
or Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) where attackers steal the whole cryptographic keys, the assumption of 
confidentiality of keys gets violated and thus leading to the penetration of the systems [1]. A novel theoretical 
foundation and an innovative perspective are required for capturing the scenarios where attackers can 
compromise systems thoroughly, and defenders can secure the systems without the fundamental key secrecy 
assumption. 
The limitation of conventional security solutions is the non-existence of a quantitative decision 
framework. As such, many research groups have begun encouraging the employment of game-theoretic 
methods. Since game theory handles the problems where several players with opposing goals compete with 
one another, it can offer a mathematical framework for the modelling and analysis of network security issues. 
The models based on game theory are natural frameworks for capturing the defensive as well as 
adversarial interaction among players [5, 6]. Game theory can offer a quantitative measure of the security 
quality provided using the Nash equilibrium concept where defender, as well as attacker, look for optimal 
strategies and none has the incentive for unilateral deviation from their equilibrium strategy regardless of their 
opposing security goals. This equilibrium concept further, quantitatively, predicts the security outcome of the 
scenario being captured by the game model. Game theory, thus, provides manageable security with its 
quantitative security measure, unlike the qualitative measure assured by cryptographic security. Furthermore, 
the game-theoretic approach can be extended to mechanism designing, allowing the system designers to shift 
the equilibrium as well as the predicted outcome in favour of the defender utilizing an intricate game design. 
The interest in the field of game and decision theory has grown for more than a decade, and it has 
become a well-proven, systematic, strong theoretical foundation of the present-day security research. Game 
theory espouses a distinct and economic perspective of security, not the same as the standard definition, i.e., 
security is not the nonexistence of threats, but the stage where attacking a system is more expensive than not 
attacking. Therefore, beginning from the game-theoretic base attains the most sophisticated self-enforcing 
protection by evaluating and generating incentives for encouraging honest behaviour instead of thwarting 
maliciousness. Simultaneously, the economic approach to security is essential as well since it is analogous to 
the progression of attackers in the present day. Cybercrime has developed into a fully-featured economy with 
the maintenance of supply chains, black marketing and mostly resembles an illicit counterpart of the legal 
software market [1]. Although conventional security forms a significant base for dealing with the problem from 
below, game theory provides a top-down approach by the adoption of strategic and economic perspectives of 
the attackers as well and thus complements technological security methods. The ideal stage is attained when 
the two routes taken up converge towards the middle, and this is the goal of game theory. 
From the survey conducted in this study, a link between various types of games and different kinds of 
security issues was observed. Examples include dynamic games for adaptive network security defence [7-11], 
multiple-layered and Stackelberg games for proactive protection [12-14], investigation of resource allocation 
methods using mechanism design theory for network security economics [15-19], game-theoretic examination 
of the concepts of cryptography – authentication and confidentiality [20, 21], network provisioning and design 
[22-25], quantitative management of security risks [26-30], and network games for cyber-physical protection 
dealing with information assurance and critical infrastructure security [31-35].  
From a cybersecurity viewpoint, the latest game theory applications to various evolving topics include 
critical infrastructure security [8, 31, 36-38], cyber-risk management [39-42], defense of moving target [43, 
44], insider threat [45, 46], cross-layer cyber physical security [32, 34, 47], adversarial machine learning [12, 
48, 49] and cyber deception [11, 50, 51].  
The rest of the paper is organised into various sections with Section 2 discussing the cybersecurity in 
detail, followed by the discussion on game theory aspects in Section 3. The relation between game theory and 
cybersecurity has been presented in Section 4, and the various categories of games have been elucidated in 
Section 5. Section 6 comprises of the illustration of varied game models that are applied in cybersecurity and 
Section 7 discusses the bridging of game theory and cryptography. Finally, the future research directions and 
concluding remarks have been given in Section 8 and 9, respectively. 
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2. CYBER SECURITY 
Before defining cybersecurity, cyberspace needs to be determined. As per National Security 
Presidential Directive 54, "Cyberspace is the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures 
including the Internet, embedded processors, computer systems, controllers in critical industries and 
telecommunication networks" [52]. The social well-being and economic development of a nation are now 
becoming reliant on cyberspace. 
Furthermore, the term ‘cyber' is also linked with various other genres such as cybergoth is associated 
with music; cyberpunk is a kind of novel based on fiction; cybercrime involves crimes done using computers, 
and cyberbullying is bullying anyone on social media or internet [53]. 
Cybersecurity has been defined in the Oxford English Dictionary [54] as, "The state of being protected 
against the criminal or unauthorized use of electronic data, or the measures taken to achieve this". Practically, 
it implies that any criminal-based or unauthorized use of electronic devices or data is regarded as a cyber threat. 
Manipulation of physical assets is also considered as threat to cybersecurity. Nevertheless, the connecting line 
between information security and cybersecurity is very thin since the issues in cybersecurity can be transformed 
into those of information security and vice versa in several instances. Some public sources even consider both 
as synonymous terms. However, cybersecurity involves human factors like people as cyber-attack targets, 
unlike information security [55]. 
European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) considers cybersecurity as 
a collective term of various realms that include communication security, operation security, information 














Figure 1.  The connection among cybersecurity domains 
The function of each of these domains is the security in respective areas. Table 1 discusses the various 
domains, along with their objectives in a detailed manner.  
Table 1.  Cybersecurity domains. 
Domain Definition 
Communication Security  Security against a threat that attempts to affect the technical setup and influence specific values in a way 
not anticipated by the designer or owner 
Operation Security  Securing against the threat that attempts to influence workflows or processes into undesirable outcomes 
Information Security  Securing data saved in cyber systems against risks of deletion, manipulation or theft 
Physical Security  Security against illicit use and securing physical assets of cyber systems like network components, 
storages or servers 
Military Security  Protection against threats against physical assets but have flavours of strategic, military or political 
aspects 
 
As is evident from Table 1 and Figure 1, each security domain focusses on its forte; nevertheless, in 
the end, all of them are linked to cybersecurity. From this perspective, cybersecurity can be understood as the 
umbrella term for all the security domains.  
The definition of cybersecurity given in Table 1 depicts the relationship between various components. 
Notably, cybersecurity is not limited to technical security of the environment, but it also includes potential 
threat sources, assets and the fundamental elements associated with organizations such as the CIA.  
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability or CIA is a significant definition associated with 
cybersecurity. While defining cybersecurity policies and information security on an organizational level, the 
CIA is considered as a fundamental element[53]. 
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Figure 2. Interdependence of cyber network and physical systems 
 
Figure 2 shows how cyber networks are interconnected with physical systems that comprise of crucial 
infrastructures like the communication network, subway and power grid. The physical system components 
such as subway stations can function properly only if the cross-layer nodes (like surveillance cameras and 
power substations) and other subway stations work correctly. This interdependent nature of the cyber-physical 
infrastructure paves the way for coordinated attack exploitation leveraging the susceptibilities in cyber 
networks and physical systems and increasing the attack probability as well as infrastructure failure rate [57]. 
For instance, cyberattacks can be used by a terrorist for compromising surveillance cameras of a government 
building, public place or an airport and planting a bomb stealthily without being sensed physically. The physical 
loss inflicted on the infrastructure systems may also aid the attackers in intruding into the cyber systems like 
control rooms and data centres. Therefore, both physical as well as cyberinfrastructure failures might lead to 
detrimental outcomes. Furthermore, the physical, logical and cyber connectivity of the setups leads to 
interdependencies and dependencies between components and nodes within and across the infrastructures. 
Consequently, the failure of an element might cause cascading failures in several arrangements. For mitigating 
these cyber-physical threats, designing effective design mechanisms is essential for hardening the physical and 
cybersecurity at the infrastructure nodes to secure them from failures. 
Together with the development in cyberinfrastructure, cyber risks are growing at a rapid pace. The 
conventional cybersecurity technologies are focussed on common threats but are not meant for the 
infrastructures with heavy traffic. Game theory provides a better approach for dealing with cybersecurity issues 
than traditional security solutions. 
 
3. ASPECTS OF GAME THEORY 
Nowadays, the research community is making all the efforts possible to bring effective network 
security solutions to organizations; and one such resolution is the utilization of theories suitable for real-life 
situations for developing mitigation methods. The game theory falls in the category of one such approach that 
is being explored by the researchers. Over the years, researchers have been investigating the applicability of 
game-theoretic methods for dealing with cybersecurity; and many of those methods have been successful. 
Game theory helps in understanding scenarios where there is an interaction among the decision-makers in some 
way. In the regular sense, a game can be considered as a competitive activity in which the players compete 
with one another based on a distinct rule-set or the moves that have already been laid down [58]. 
With growing distributed and infrastructure-less systems, game theory has also found applicability in 
the security of decentralized communication systems viz. wireless sensor networks (WSN) [59]. Such a 
security scenario, involving the interaction of attacker and defender, can be precisely mapped to a game among 
the players where every player tries their best to increase their profit. Most importantly, game theory is perfectly 
suitable for such a security model since the action taken by the attacker or defender relies on the behaviour of 
the opposite party [60-62].   
Lately, the extensive application of game theory in the field of security is categorized into security 
games. Besides cybersecurity, game theory has applications in many other spheres such as politics, sciences, 
economics, auction, finance, etc. This paper reviews the game theory applications in cybersecurity. 
 
3.1.  Definition of a game 
Applying mathematical analysis of cooperative and/or individual behaviours among players selecting 
a specific action/strategy to fulfil their self-interests can be understood as game theory [63].  
The definitions of the basic parameters of a game have been given below: 
1. A game is defined as the strategic interaction among cooperating or opposing interests taking into 
account the payoffs for the actions taken by the players and constraints without revealing anything 
about the actual steps carried out [58].  
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2. A player is the fundamental game entity involved in a game with a finite player set (depicted by 𝑁) 
that take logical actions (illustrated by 𝐴𝑖), for every player 𝑖. A player can be a machine, a group of 
people or an individual in the game.   
3. The payoff/utility is the negative or positive reward given to players for their actions in the game. It is 
signified as 𝑢𝑖: 𝐴 → ℝ, that measures the result for the player 𝑖 based on the actions of other players 
𝐴 =×𝑖∈𝑁 𝐴𝑖, where ℝ is the set of real numbers, and × indicates Cartesian product.  
4. A strategy implies the plan of action that can be adopted by a player in the game that can be represented 
in the strategic/extensive form as 
Game = 〈𝑁, (𝐴), (𝑢𝑖)〉        (1) 
Game theory is a description of a multi-person decision scenario as a game where every player selects 
an action that leads to the best reward for their ownselves while expecting logical actions from the rest of the 
players. A typical game, when applied to game theory, is characterized by four fundamental features, which 
are: 
a) Two or more players 
b) Competing nature 
c) Rules governing each game 
d) Payoffs for every player   
 
3.2.  Nash equilibrium 
An important game-theoretic concept is the Nash Equilibrium that is defined as the intersection point 
of best responses, i.e., every player plays their best response against the actions of the rest of the players [58]. 
In general, Nash equilibrium is an intelligent solution to social problems that have become a favourable concept 
for wireless sensor network security [64, 65]. 
Nash equilibrium is a solution concept describing the steady-state game condition; no player would 
desire to modify its strategy since it may decrease their payoffs provided the rest of the players are following 
the stipulated policy. 
However, this solution concept indicates the steady-state in the game without specifying how to reach 
such a state. Although various other solution concepts are utilized occasionally, Nash equilibrium is the most 
prominent. This information shall be employed for defining games having relevant characteristics to represent 
network security issues [58]. 
Let us assume the strategy profile for an 𝑁 player game is 
𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3, … … … 𝑎𝑁
∗        (2) 
Where 𝑎𝑁
∗  denotes Nash equilibrium, if every player 𝑖 has a payoff value 𝑢𝑖, then 
𝑢𝑖(𝑎𝑖
∗, 𝑎−𝑖
∗ ) ≥ 𝑢𝑖(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑎−𝑖
∗ )       (3) 
Must be valid for every player 𝑖 with 𝑎𝑖
∗ denoting the action profile of player 𝑖 and 𝑎−𝑖
∗  indicating the 
equilibrium action of the rest of the players.  
For each game, two significant concepts hold, viz. common knowledge and rationality. Common 
knowledge comprises of the earliest comprehension of results as well as the mutual knowledge of every player 
about the results. Rationality, on the other hand, specifies the consistency in decisions without taking into 
account the likes/dislikes of the players within the game [66]. 
Take into consideration a simple game – Prisoner’s dilemma that involves only two players. The 
matrix representation of the game is given in Figure 3.  
-1, -1 -9, 0


















Figure 3. Matrix representation of a game 
The police have arrested two people who have been accused of the possession of guns. They are 
suspected of having committed a crime; they both shall be put behind bars for a 6-year term if neither of them 
admits. But if only one of them confesses, he/she shall be freed, and the other one shall be imprisoned for nine 
years. Now, if both of them admit to the crime, each of them shall be jailed for a year. In such a game, the Nash 
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equilibrium shall be reached when both of them refuse the crime because neither has prior knowledge about 
their partner's action. The result of this game is depicted in Figure 3 as (-6, -6).  
 
4. GAME THEORY AND CYBER SECURITY 
The recent proliferation in cyber-attacks, as well as identity thefts, have turned the Internet into a 
daunting place. Cyber-attacks have generated a global threat, in securing global as well as local networks [4]. 
They are also threatening society since communication, and economic infrastructures primarily rely on 
information technology and computer networks [63]. 
 Therefore, more effective defence strategies are a must for countering the threats caused by the rising 
cybersecurity concerns. In cybersecurity, game theory can help in knowing the response of the defender to the 
attacker and vice versa. A two-player game can be used to capture the strategic interaction between the attacker 
and defender in which both players try to maximize their interests. The strategy of the attacker is determined 
by the actions of the defender and vice versa. Therefore, a defence mechanism can be said to be valid on the 
basis of the strategic behaviours of the attacker and the defender. A tactical analysis can be performed by 
employing game theory for investigating the attacks from multiple nodes or a single node. As a result, game 
theory is essential for studying the strategic decision-making scenarios of defenders and analysing the attackers' 
incentives. 
There are several aspects in which game-theoretic methods are better than the traditional approaches 
to cybersecurity and privacy, which have been discussed below [63]: 
(1) Well-timed action: Owing to the absence of incentives for the participants, traditional security solutions are 
adopted rather slowly. However, game-theoretic methods back the defenders by the employment of 
fundamental incentive mechanisms for allocating restricted resources to even out the risks perceived. 
(2) Proven mathematics: Majority of the traditional security approaches that are implemented in reactive 
devices like anti-virus programs or preventive tools like firewalls are dependent only on heuristics. 
Nonetheless, game-theoretic approaches analyse the security decisions methodically with proven mathematics. 
(3) Distributed solution: The decision-making in conventional security solutions is centralized and not 
distributed (or individualized) in nature. Because of the absence of coordinators in autonomous systems, the 
centralized decision-making process is almost impossible in network security games. Thus, security solutions 
can be realized in a distributed way by making use of game theory. 
(4) Reliable defence: The researchers can design defence strategies for robust and dependable cybersecurity 
systems against attacks (or selfish behaviours) based on the analytical results provided from game theory. 
All the reasons as mentioned above, make game theory a suitable solution for cybersecurity problems. 
Nevertheless, the following issues need to be kept in mind while using game-theoretical methods for 
implementation in cyber systems: 
(1) Multi-layer protection: In the previous works reviewed, it is observed that the defender targets a particular 
defence mechanism and attempts to maximize its utility by adjusting suitable parameters. Nevertheless, the 
presence of multiple layers of defenders providing security against the attack, that is frequently realized in the 
current cyber systems, is overlooked. Thus, a fitting game-theoretic approach is needed to resolve how 
multiple-layer defenders can offer security against attacks while implementing the defending layers 
simultaneously and how the other layers can be enhanced. 
(2) Rationality: Most of the game-theoretic methods utilized in cybersecurity emphasize on equilibrium 
strategies in the action profiles of the attackers and defenders. But it is not easy for the attacker or the defender 
to provide the best-response actions owing to constrained rationality (in terms of restricted resources or 
information) in real cyber systems [67]. Thus, suitable models like Quantal Response Equilibrium and Prospect 
Theory are essential for predicting the behaviour of the players [68, 69]. Moreover, in the scenarios with 
multiple equilibria, it is not clear what the players shall select or if at all they agree to choose one.  
(3) Implementation: When the defenders and attackers make decisions in real cyber systems, they take into 
account several factors that are real but uncertain like signal-to-noise ratio, the traffic produced in a typical 
network and/or the node power in wireless networks. Nevertheless, the defenders may not perceive the entire 
information accurately in realistic situations. Consequently, they should be able to study the environment and 
understand it. Besides, there are several game-theoretic methods that model security games as two-player 
games with multiple defenders or attackers being taken as a single entity. Two-player games are realistic 
models if multiple defenders or attackers have the same payoffs and strategies but might not be reasonable in 
a real system owing to the variety in the payoffs and strategies of defenders and attackers. 
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The game theory thus plays an integral part in acquiring an equilibrium strategy for surviving from 
unpredicted interruptions and attacks because of the interaction among users in cyber communication. 
Furthermore, in connection with cyber privacy, the game theory also finds applications in information sharing, 
anonymity, confidentiality and cryptography.  
 
5. CLASSIFICATION OF GAMES WITH THEIR APPICATIONS IN NETWORK SECURITY 
On the basis of perspectives, games can be categorized into several classes. The varied types of games 
have been discussed in this section below: Figure 4 represents the classification of various game models plus 








































Figure 4. Classification of game models 
Co-operative games: In a cooperative game, every player enforces cooperative behaviour. Such games are 
between the coalitions of players rather than between two players only. Cooperative games thus accentuate 
group efficiency, equity and rationality [71]. 
Non Co-operative games: In non-cooperative games, every player exhibits selfish behaviour without taking 
into consideration the opponents. The chief goal of every player is gain in payoffs. Non-cooperative games 
accentuate individual optimal decisions and individual rationality. This game type is the research goal of 
contemporary game theory; notably, several cybersecurity issues are non-cooperative games [71]. 
Strategic/Static Games: In this type of game, every player makes a one-time decision before the game begins. 
No player keeps the information about any other player's behaviour. Static games are one-shot games in which 
every player selects their plan of action, and the decisions of all the players are made at the same time [58]. 
This implies that whenever a plan of action is chosen by a player, no other player is informed about it. 
Extensive/Dynamic Games: In dynamic games, every player has some knowledge about the behaviours of the 
rest of the players, unlike static games; besides, these are multi-stage games. The players in this game make 
decisions on the basis of the opponent's behaviour. Such games are sequential structures of the decision-making 
problems that the players of static games come across. The game sequences can be finite or infinite [58]. 
Complete Information Games: The games in which every player within the game has comprehensive 
knowledge about the opponents’ behaviour are said to be complete information games. Every player is 
completely aware of all the opponents’ strategies.  
Incomplete Information Games: The game in which any one of the players has zero information about the 
opponent players. As a result, the players may not be able to make perfect strategies for winning the game.  
Perfect Information Games: In this type of game, every player has the perfect knowledge of all the previous 
actions of the opponent player before making a move. Chess, go, and tic-tac-toe are examples of perfect 
information games [58]. 
Imperfect Information Games: In such games, there is at least one player who does not know about the past 
actions of the opponent player, thus making it tough for the player to make a move. Cybersecurity falls in this 
type of game category. 
Bayesian Game: It is well-known that every outcome is valuable to every player in recreational games since 
the game rules quantify this. On the contrary, when real-world strategic scenarios are modelled, every player 
might be uncertain about the value of various outcomes to the rest of the players. Such uncertainty can be 
modelled naturally using Bayesian games. In Bayesian games, every player selects one 'type' from distribution 
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at the beginning of the game. That type determines the value of every outcome to the player. Every player has 
knowledge about its type but does not have any comprehension about the kind chosen by other players. 
Moreover, Bayesian games may be transformed into standard form, but there shall be an exponential growth 
in size [72]. This type of game is referred to as Bayesian, owing to the employment of Bayesian analysis in 
anticipating the outcome [73].  
Stochastic Game: These games are multi-player generalizations of Markov decision processes. In every state, 
an action is chosen by all the players and the profile of actions chosen govern the instant reward to all of them 
together with their probabilistic transitions [72]. Thus, such games progress as a series of states beginning from 
a start state. Then, the players acquire a payoff after selecting their actions based on the present game state. 
This is followed by the transition of the game into a different state with a probability determined by the current 
state and actions of the players [74]. Stochastic games having just one state are referred to as repeated games 
in which the same normal-form game is played by the players repeatedly. 
Repeated Game: As defined already, repeated games are an interaction of two players that play the game 
repeatedly [64]. Also known as iterative games, this game comprises of many repetitive stages, and at every 
step, the present action determines the next action of the players. Repeated games can be either finitely repeated 
or infinitely repeated. There is a fixed and known time-period in infinitely repeated games. However, it has a 
limitation that makes the player behave selfishly, and Nash Equilibrium is used to equal minmax payoff. The 
most popular type is the infinitely repeated game in which the game continues for an infinite period [59].   
Zero-sum Game: It is a kind of non-cooperative game played between two players. One of the players is the 
maximizer since it attempts to raise its gain to the maximum and the other player is the minimizer since it tries 
to keep its losses to the minimum. As a result, the zero-sum game can be assumed to be a one-side win game 
or two-side conflict game in which the overall payoff/utility of the players stays constant throughout the game, 
∑ 𝑢𝑖(𝑠) = 0 ∀ 𝒔 ∈ 𝑆,
2
𝑖=1 𝒔 being the strategy profile [59]. 
Non-zero-sum Game: This type of game can be played by multiple players, and the sum of the payoff values 
of the players does not remain constant during the game [59]. So, all the game players are either maximizers 
or minimizers without having any constraints on the overall payoff value as is the case with zero-sum games. 
Thus, all the players in the game can lose or gain together [64].  
Evolutionary Game: Evolutionary games are basically applied to biological networks in which pure and mixed 
strategies might be merged by the players with logical behaviour for enhancing the population characteristics 
[64]. Notably, evolutionary games have been utilized in the past to model various wireless sensor network 
applications [59]. 
Stackelberg Game: Stackelberg games are used for modelling two competing players where one of the players 
is the initiator (or leader) of the game who opts an action from a specific set 𝐴1, and the other player follows 
the action of the leader to choose later a move from a different set 𝐴2[59]. Such a situation is prevalent for 
protecting various wireless sensor networks where the attacker acts as the follower, and the defender plays the 
role of the leader [75, 76]. 
A distinctive category of games called security games analyse the interaction between defenders and 
malicious attackers. These games, along with their solutions, form the base of algorithm development and 
formal decision-making besides the prediction of the behaviour of the attackers. Moreover, security games find 
vast applications to security issues like intrusion detection and privacy in computer, wireless and vehicular 
networks [77]. 
 
6. GAME-THEORETICAL METHODS FOR CYBER SECURITY APPLICATIONS 
From the perspective of game-theoretic applications in cybersecurity, there are six categories of 
security applications: 
6.1.  Physical layer security 
It is an evolving area of security. Eavesdropping and jamming attacks are commonplace on the 
communication channel of networks [70]. Notably, these attacks are more alarming for wireless networks in 
comparison to wired networks. 
In this regard, a game-theoretic model was introduced by authors in [78] for examining the 
communication between the source transmitting valuable data and some available jammers who aid the source 
in puzzling the eavesdroppers. Those jammers charge some cost from the source for their service and then there 
is a price trade-off. Stackelberg game has been put forward by the authors plus a distributed algorithm for 
investigating the result of the game to display the effectiveness of the price trade-off and the friendly jamming 
service. 
IJEEI  ISSN: 2089-3272  
 
A Comprehensive Insight into Game Theory in relevance to Cyber Security (Farhat Anwar et al.) 
197 
 
6.2.  Self-organized network security 
A specific application of game theory is the design of security protocols for self-organized networks 
like mobile adhoc networks (MANETs), wireless sensor networks or vehicular networks. Due to the relatively 
static configuration and homogenous architecture of self-organized networks, the behaviour of the network 
tends to be like that of a reasonable decision-maker or a logical economic man, therefore making it consistent 
with the game theory requirements. 
Several previous works take into account only two players in their game models when applying game 
theory to security. But it might not be practical in case of MANETs that have no centralized administration. In 
the scenarios with multiple players, a robust mathematical tool is mean-field game theory. In [79], authors have 
employed the contemporary developments in mean-field game theory for proposing a new game theory-based 
distributed approach for MANET security with multiple players. Such an approach allows a distinct MANET 
node to make decisions of strategic defence, and every node needs the knowledge of its state together with the 
cumulative effect of the rest of the nodes in the MANET. 
 
6.3.  Intrusion detection and prevention 
Intrusion detection is considered to be one of the most broadly applied security research areas in terms 
of game theory owing to its attack and defence characteristic [70]. With the study of game models, it is possible 
to optimize the distributed design as well as security configuration of intrusion detection systems. In this regard, 
defence strategies based on puzzles have been put forth against flooding attacks 
An automated intrusion response engine has been introduced by authors in [80] that is referred to as 
Response and Recovery Engine (RRE). This engine makes use of game-theory based response strategies to 
ward off intruders that are displayed as opponents in a two-player stochastic Stackelberg game with RRE and 
the attacker attempting to raise their benefits to the maximum by considering the response actions and the 
optimal opponent respectively. There are many research-works that utilize game theory for intrusion detection 
as well as prevention. For instance, a collaborative incentive-based game-theoretic method has been designed 
for intrusion detection in [81], another game theory model has been proposed in [82] for the detection of 
cooperative intrusion over multiple packets, a protracted Dirichlet based collaborative IDS based on game 
theory has been given in [83], and authors in [84] present a game-theoretic approach to configure large scale 
intrusion detection signature dynamically. 
 
6.4.  Privacy preservation and anonymity  
From the perspective of game theory, privacy can be evaluated by the users, and various strategies 
can be inspected for their desired privacy level setting. Game theory can prove beneficial in analysing the 
privacy preservation economically and in finding the best compromise between performance and privacy. 
Several effective location-based services bring convenience to the users but at the cost of the privacy of users. 
Authors in [85] have been the first to put forward an optimal mechanism that finds the location besides 
preserving user privacy in location-based service. The Stackelberg Bayesian games are used for modelling the 
mutual optimization of localization accuracy vs location privacy, and it has been proven that this methodology 
showed better results in comparison to a direct obfuscation mechanism. Furthermore, the interaction among 
data collectors, data users and data providers have been modelled in [86] using a game and a general 
methodology for finding Nash equilibrium. 
 
6.5.  Economics of cyber security  
Since the game theory was set up initially in the theoretical framework of economics, it can be applied 
chiefly to cybersecurity economics. Various standard economic models and theories find applications to the 
economic perspective of security like security policy making, security incentive and security investment. 
Securing the network infrastructure against attacks is a must because the attacks on high-speed data links could 
cause a delay or loss of large-scale data. 
In the works [87, 88], authors have studied the incentive mechanism in network security by 
investigating the network externality that is produced by the price of anarchy (POA) and selfish investment 
behaviour. They have proved that network security can be improved dramatically by enhancing incentive 
mechanisms of cybersecurity investment rather than by the enhancement in security preservation methods. 
 
6.6.  Cloud computing security  
Cloud computing is a thriving industry and a well-known concept of information processing. Still, its 
security problem is complicated due to the use of varied infrastructure elements in every service model [70]. 
The conventional security mechanisms are not apt for cloud computing because novel cloud concepts like 
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outsourcing, resource-sharing and multi-tenancy are challenging to the security research community. But game 
theory can make a difference in this issue. 
Different public cloud users share a common platform such as the hypervisor. This universal platform 
intensifies the well-known problem of cybersecurity interdependency, and a user who does not invest in 
cybersecurity imposes a negative externality on others. This is one of the reasons that many large organizations 
with sensitive information have been reluctant to join a public cloud. 
A framework has been put forward by authors in [10] known as FlipIt game for cloud security that 
provides details about when devices should trust the cloud hypervisor's commands. This communication is 
modelled as a game with the device, attacker and the defender as the players. A game theoretic-security risk 
assessment model has been proposed in [89] for cloud computing that is scalable such that it is assessed if the 
system risks should be fixed by tenant or cloud provider. Authors in [90] have modelled the problem of cloud 
security transparency as a non-cooperative dynamic game in which the client and provider are modelled as the 
game players. Consequently, authors have presented a theoretical examination for the client or provider to 
compute the best strategy for reaching the Nash equilibrium.  
 
7. BLENDING GAME THEORY AND CRYPTOGRAPHY 
Both game theory and cryptographic protocols deal with the analysis of interactions among mutually 
suspecting parties. Historically, both the fields have evolved independently of each other within diverse 
research communities and thus are likely to have different flavours. Nevertheless, there has been growing 
interest in merging the approaches and techniques of these fields that were inspired by the desire for developing 
more pragmatic protocols and models of such an interaction. The present research at the relation of 
cryptography and game theory can be divided into two categories: applying game-theoretic models to 
cryptographic protocol design and applying cryptographic protocols to the problems based on game theory. 
Conventionally, the protocols in cryptography are devised, assuming that a few participants are 
authentic and follow the protocols faithfully while other participants are malicious and act haphazardly. 
However, the game-theoretic perception is that every participant is rational and acts according to its best 
interest. Such a perspective is different from the cryptographic one, according to which the protocol need not 
avert to irrational behaviour although no one can be trusted to follow the protocol unless it acts in the 
participant’s best interests. 
In general, cryptography focusses on guaranteeing that the parties continue to use the authorized 
service and game-theoretic approach has the same goal. Game-theoretic methods are used for devising 
incentive mechanisms that aim to avert diversion. An important motive to apply the game-theoretic method in 
cryptography is the modelling of malicious behaviour of the user. The rationale behind this is that malicious 
actions are not only more challenging to control than rational actions, but it is also more common and practical 
for some parties to follow the cryptographic protocol dishonestly. For enhancing the security and efficiency of 
cryptographic protocols, many new terminologies and approaches have been proposed by researchers. For 
instance, socio-rational secret sharing, employment of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) or utilization of 
point-to-point channels rather than trusted mediators. Also, game-theoretic methods have been used in 
steganography and have proved to be ideal in allowing researchers to assess several design choices like 
distribution of payload in batch steganography or distortion functions in adaptive steganography. All these 
approaches exhibit the huge benefit that blending of cryptography and game theory brings in designing defence 
mechanisms. 
 
8. FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
Possible future research directions of game-theoretic approaches for cybersecurity and privacy may 
consist of several emerging areas as follows: 
8.1.  Social media 
In recent times, social media sites, for instance, Twitter and Facebook, have been emerging as 
excellent ways of communication. These sites can be used by attackers as novel media for conducting insidious 
attacks. Owing to the massive centralized user data, increased attention should be paid to privacy protection. 
The application of game theory to social media can help us identify the objectives of social media users and 
how they work to achieve them. Based on formalized utilities of security policies and security rules, the choice 
of security policies in content access is described as a game between the content provider and the content 
requester. 
 
8.2.  Cloud computing 
Debatably, cloud computing is assumed to be one of the essential technological shifts in recent times. 
Nevertheless, while shifting data to clouds, various challenges to security and privacy are posed. Game theory 
is a potential mathematical framework for analyzing the effects and causes of privacy and integrity issues for 
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cloud computing [89]. Authors in [91] have put forward methods for reacting automatically to the opponent's 
behaviour for securing the system through Q-Learning. The researchers, after comparing Q-Learning with the 
conventional stochastic game, presented simulation results that affirm Naive Q-Learning as a potential 
approach on confrontation with limited information about adversaries. 
 
8.3.  Bitcoin 
Bitcoin is an electronic decentralized fiat currency that is implemented through peer-to-peer 
technology and cryptography. The designing of secure and effective mining methods is one of the challenges 
faced by bitcoins. Minigas, a game, can be modelled among all users through game theory. 
 
8.4.  Embedded security 
At a single point, attacks of malware can occur in the hardware. It’s the most beneficial entity which 
provides the ability for manipulating a computing system. The attackers secretly and deliberately bring 
modification to electronic devices like integrity circuits for creating hardware Trojans. Game theory is the 
mathematical treatment of conflict, thus could be utilised for strategically guiding microcircuit testing to 
balance the risk posed by hardware Trojans. 
 
8.5.  Cyber-insurance 
Techniques of risk management for improving cybersecurity are promising solutions with economic 
benefits for security software vendors, users and policymakers. The game-theoretic approaches have been 
employed in various cyber insurance research works for modelling the interactions among the players of cyber 
market insurance where the retail of cyber-insurance is taken as a defence mechanism. Though game theory 
may assist in designing mechanisms incentivizing the insurers, more methods are required for answering the 
questions that cyber insurance poses for improving cybersecurity and privacy. 
 
8.6.  Internet-of-Things (IoT) 
IoT provides connection among numerous smart devices integrated in networks seamlessly for 
offering services in every aspect of human life. Being susceptible to varied attacks, the research community 
needs to emphasize on the privacy as well as the security of IoT applications. Due to the speedy development 
in technology making up the IoT, several new crucial problems and significant security issues in IoT shall be 
the potential topics for game-theoretic methods. 
 
8.7.  Device-to-Device communications 
Device-to-Device (D2D) is emerging as a new trend in industrial as well as academic communities 
due to the economic energy consumption and high throughput. It is expected to be a key feature supported by 
next-generation cellular networks. D2D can extend the cellular coverage allowing users to communicate when 
telecommunications infrastructure is highly congested or absent. Various potential topics in relevance to D2D 
communication such as secure transmission, enhanced quality-of-service and energy efficiency can be 
considered utilizing the utility function maximization game frameworks.   
 
9. CONCLUSION  
Game theory has been found to play a vital role in numerous security situations and has been 
extensively applied in cybersecurity. The latest research works conducted reveal the effective use of game 
theory in web security, network security, etc. Game theory allows the defender to assess the security 
quantitatively and predict the security outcome in addition to offering a mechanism design tool for enabling 
security-by-design and reversing the advantage of the attacker. Games can be analysed and designed; players' 
optimal moves can be utilized for determining how effectively security can be approached in the cyber world. 
However, an essential game-theoretic issue is the ability to find a feasible mathematical solution to the game 
problem. More systematic solutions that solve the problem of cybersecurity utilizing game theory are 
recommended which involve practical mathematical solutions. One such approach that is presently being 
studied by the research community is the employment of linear programming. Furthermore, integer 
programming can be delved into for offering a more pragmatic solution to distributed denial of service attacks 
in the cyber world. 
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